Millions For Defense

We have recently come across various commentators suggesting that advanced weapons systems being developed by the US are simply not needed and that the money would be better spent elsewhere. The argument is roughly as follows:

The Soviet Union is gone, taking with it the threat of massive “conventional” warfare;

Current US weapons are vastly superior to anything a potential enemy can field, and will remain that way for the foreseeable future;

Massive weapons are out of place in an era of “small wars” and “asymmetric” conflicts. After all, Iraq remains in turmoil despite the quality and quantity of US arms.

It is an argument that merits scrutiny.

On the question of massive weapons and small wars, we submit that America’s current one-sided military advantages are not obsolete; but that they help keep wars “small.” Hit and run tactics, rather than sustained invasions, are preferred by parties with smaller numbers or fewer weapons than their opponents. They are frightening and destructive, but generally lack the destructive impact of a column of invading tanks or carpet bombing with cluster bombs. 9/11 was a tragedy, and a brilliant piece of unconventional tactics. But it was also a “one hit wonder” by an opponent who lacked the ability to either launch a conventional attack against US forces or to capitalize on the confusion and terror they engendered. There is some comfort in the knowledge that 9/11 was the best a resourceful and determined enemy could do in the face of American military might.

But, the argument goes, an aircraft carrier cannot deter a nut with a suitcase nuke. No doubt; but nuts, but definition, are not influenced by rational considerations. It is unwise to let core policy be driven by such wildcards. In contrast to the “nut,” an aircraft carrier can deter a rogue nation from indulging in terror attacks or proxy wars. Recall how abruptly terror attacks in Europe declined after the US air raids on Libya. The message was clear: “You may harm us, but we can obliterate you.” The lesson was repeated in Afghanistan after 9/11. The Taliban was deposed with remarkable speed. We attribute part of the security the US has enjoyed since 9/11 to that fact – no other nation has, we believe, been willing to risk the consequences of “hosting” another attack on the US homeland. Such security comes only from the ability to project massively superior force anywhere in the world.

Yet questions remain. Why are new weapons needed given the current superiority and the likelihood that it will remain unchallenged for some time to come. Without claiming to be weapons experts, we note some general principals. History teaches us that “superiority” is often illusory. In 1905 the Russian Empire thought they would easily crush the “inferior” Japanese. The French thought the massive Maginot Line was superior to anything a foe could throw against it. Perhaps it was. But the Nazis simply went around it. More recently, 25 years ago even scholars would have scoffed at the thought that remote, impoverished Pakistan could acquire the atomic bomb. We should also bear in mind the fact that our enemies are unlikely to tell us about their latest innovations and that the “foreseeable future” might be an extremely short period of time. Consider the advances in computer technology in just the past five years.
We would prefer to deter would-be enemies by constantly raising the bar, rather than risking attack by a determined opponent who believes he has parity in material terms and superior morale and dedication. Thus the old saying: “To have peace, prepare for war.”
There remains the question of America’s industrial power – our perceived ability to turn out more and better weapons, faster than anyone else, as demonstrated in World War II. World War II, however, is a troubling example. Would it have been avoided had the Allies possessed all those ships, tanks, planes and trained troops in 1939? Consider also that, but for a number of lucky blunders, the Nazis could have won the war in Europe, despite all of America’s manufacturing power. Neither should we conclude that US industrial might is absolute. China’s capacity grows daily, along with the sophistication of its products. North Korean missiles are advanced, and for sale. A well funded opponent may well be able to buy what is needed to pose a significant conventional threat to US interests.

Bear in mind that US interests do not end at the water’s edge. A suitcase nuke in NY or LA would be terrifying. A systematic attack on the nation’s oil supply could be devastating. But that is something an aircraft carrier can help prevent.

We agree with the general principle that defense funds should be spent wisely and that all systems should be tested in light of current and future needs. We disagree, however, with the theory that the nation needs only “just enough” weapons – that we need only enough weapons to respond effectively and ultimately prevail. History teaches that such “parity” invites aggression – witness Pearl Harbor. Better to win without firing a shot. We do not want weapons system an opponent thinks he can defeat. We want weapons that will make a would-be aggressor pee his pants.